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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WENDALYN ENCE, nka
WENDALYN SMITH,

:
CASE NO. 981707 -- CA

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

:

LARRY D. ENCE,

:
:

PRIORITY NO. 15

Respondent/Appelldfi*.

Appellee, LARRY ENCE, hereinafter "Husband" or
"Respondent", submits the following Brief:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
Rules 3 and 4 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE and to
§78-2a-3(2) (h) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's award of alimony for 21

years was within its broad discretion where the trial court
specifically addressed the needs and standard of living of
the Husband, the Husband's earning ability, and the Wife's
ability to provide support?
"In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has

1

broad discretion, and its decisions will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice."
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992) (citing
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Whether the trial court's award of alimony was

within its broad discretion as a compensating award of
alimony?
"In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has
broad discretion, and its decisions will not be overturned
absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice."

Id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appellant submits that there are no statutory or
constitutional provisions determinative of the issues
presented herein.

However §30-3-5 UTAH CODE ANN. is relevant

to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
Appellant, Wendalyn Ence, now known as Wendalyn Smith

(and hereinafter referred to as "Wife") filed a Complaint on
January 5, 1995 seeking a divorce from Husband, in Weber
County District Court.

A trial was held on September 8,

1995, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, presiding.
2

As to the issue of alimony, the court ordered the Wife
to pay the Husband $1,700.00 per month for a period of 21
years.

In addition, the court ordered the Wife to pay a

portion of the Husband's attorney's fees incurred in this
action.
The Wife appealed and the Husband cross-appealed.

This

Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further
findings on the issues of alimony and attorney fees.
On remand, the trial court entered more findings of
fact and conclusions of law specifically addressing the
issues of the Husband's financial need, his ability to earn,
and the wife's ability to provide support.
The Amended Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact were
entered on September 24, 1998.

This Decree awarded Husband

alimony of $1,500.00 per month for 4 years and $800.00 per
month thereafter for 17 years.

In addition, the trial court

again awarded the Husband a portion of his attorney's fees
incurred herein.
From this Amended Decree, the Wife has appealed.
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on November 25, 1974.
425).

(ROA

At the time of the marriage, the Wife was 21 years of

3

age and the Husband was 35 years of age.

(ROA 425). At the

time of trial, the parties had been married for 21 years and
had two children, both of whom had reached their majority.
(ROA 425). At the time of trial, Husband was 56 years of
age and Wife was 42 years of age.

(ROA 256).

Throughout the parties' marriage, the Husband worked
full-time as a heavy equipment operator, and has worked in
the field since 1956.

(ROA 257). He has no college

training and he has graduated from high school.

(ROA 256).

Husband earned approximately $18.52 per hour during the time
the Wife was in medical school.

(ROA 266). The company

Husband worked for was purchased by another company while
Wife was in medical school and his wage dropped to $14.50
per hour.

(ROA 268). After six months this was raised to

$15.00 per hour.

(ROA 270).

When the parties married, the Wife worked as a
secretary in a hospital.

(ROA 143). During the marriage

when the parties' children were young, the Wife was the
primary caregiver and worked part-time at home as a typist
for the local airport.

(ROA 144).

In January of 1981, the

Wife entered college at Glendale Community College.
145).

(ROA

She transferred to Grand Canyon University in 1983.
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(ROA 145).

She obtained her undergraduate degree 1985.

(ROA 146).
Throughout her four years of undergraduate education,
the Wife borrowed approximately $6,000.00 for tuition and
received some scholarships.

(ROA 148). Throughout all of

this time the Husband supported the family through his fulltime employment as a heavy equipment operator.

(ROA 257).

For the two years after graduating from college, the
Wife worked as an estimator for an industrial truss company
and as a substitute teacher.

(ROA 150). The Wife earned

approximately $15,000.00 per year during this time.
151).

(ROA

For these two years the Husband supported the family

through his full-time employment.

(ROA 257).

The Wife applied for and was accepted to medical school
in 1987.

(ROA 152). The Wife and the parties' children

moved to Tucson for the Wife to attend medical school at the
University of Arizona.

(ROA 153).

In order to facilitate

this move and the Wife's desire to go to medical school, the
parties purchased a home in Tucson in 1987.

(ROA 152-153).

During this time, as stated above, the Husband was
supporting the family with his full-time employment which
allowed the Wife and the parties' children to move to Tucson
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and the Wife to attend medical school.

(ROA 257 ROA 155).

During these four years, the Husband had to live apart
from Wife and his children in order to keep his job and
support his family and Wife's decision to attend medical
school.

(ROA 140-41).

The parties sold their trailer home

and purchased a home in Tucson, while Husband stayed in
Phoenix during the work week and lived in a 1965 19 foot
camp trailer and spent the weekends in Tucson.
65).

(ROA 264-

During the four years that the Wife was in medical

school, Husband worked 40 hours a week, as well as "a lot of
overtime."

(ROA 267). Husband tried to find a job in

Tucson so that he could be with his family more, but with
Wife in medical school, the children to support, and the
house in Tucson, it was not financially feasible for Husband
to take a lower paying job in Tucson.

(ROA 268).

During medical school, the Wife incurred approximately
$49,000.00 in student loans.

(ROA 155). Approximately

$23,000.00 of this amount went to tuition, books, and other
educational expenses.

(ROA 155). The remaining $26,000.00

assisted with household expenses over her four years in
medical school, or $6,500.00 per year.

(ROA 155).

During

her third and fourth years of medical school, Wife "hired" a
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first year medical student to act as a nanny.

(ROA 205).

In exchange for room and board living in the Tucson home,
this nanny cooked for the parties' children, made sure they
got to bed, helped them with their homework, and got them
off to school in the morning.

(ROA 205).

In addition,

during the Wife's four years of medical school, the parties'
savings of approximately $10,000.00 were spent.

(ROA 239

ROA 254).
Wife graduated from medical school in May of 1991.
(ROA 163). The family moved to Ogden, Utah in June of 1991
to allow the Wife to complete her internship and residency
requirements at McKay Dee Hospital.

(ROA 163). Wife

completed her internship and residency in June of 1994.
(ROA 164).
When the parties moved to Ogden, Husband was 52 years
of age and had trouble finding employment.

(ROA 271).

There were very few union jobs in Utah and $10.00 per hour
was the top wage.

(ROA 272). After discussing the

situation, the parties decided that Husband should stay home
with the parties' children and take care of the house.
274) .
During 1994, the last full year of the parties'

7

(ROA

marriage, the Wife earned $106,381.00.

(ROA 171). After

the parties' separation, Husband found work in St. George,
Utah, and was paid $12.00 per hour at the time of trial.
(ROA 172-173).

At the time of trial, Wife was making

$120,000.00 per year.

(ROA 199).

In addition to this

salary, under her employment contract, the hospital paid
other expenses for the wife as well, including $1,600.00 per
month to pay back her student loans in full, paying for her
malpractice insurance, paying for her continuing education,
and her overhead.

(ROA 199-200).

On November 12, 1995, the trial court entered a Decree
of Divorce, and, in relevant part, ordered Wife to pay
Husband $1,700.00 per month for alimony for 21 years, and
ordered Wife to pay a portion of Husband's attorney's fees.
(ROA 108). Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on December 12,
1995.

(ROA 116). This Court entered a Memorandum Decision

on November 7, 1996, case #950829 CA, reversing and
remanding the issues of attorneys fees and alimony for
further factual findings.

(ROA 375-76).

The trial court

entered subsequent findings on remand, and specifically
awarded Husband alimony of $1,500.00 per month for the first
four years, and $800.00 per month for 17 more years.

8

(ROA

425-35) .

On September 16, 1997, the trial court filed its

Findings of Fact and Order which supplemented its findings
with regards to the award of a portion of Husband's
attorney's fees.

(ROA 435 these findings are attached as

Addendum A to this brief).
Wife filed her Notice of Appeal on October 22, 1998.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Wife's attack on the trial court's findings must fail
for two reasons.

First, Wife has failed to marshal all of

the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate
that, even if viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support
the findings.

Wife simply ignores the evidence in support

of the findings and reargues the facts which were already
considered and weighed at the trial level.
Second, Wife is precluded from challenging the findings
of the trial court as she drafted the findings which were
adopted by the trial court and has not alleged any fraud on
the trial court.

Wife now argues facts which were already

argued at trial and not included in the findings which she
drafted.

Therefore, Wife has effectively waived any

objection to the findings, and such a waiver is conclusive

9

on appeal.
The trial court's award of alimony, in duration and
amount, is within the trial court's broad discretion under
both theories which the trial court clearly addressed in its
Findings of Fact and Order.

(ROA 425, Addendum " A " ) .

The

first theory the trial court employed was to use alimony to
maintain the Husband, as closely as possible, at a
reasonable standard of living.

The trial court specifically

addressed the Husband's needs and standard of living during
the marriage, his ability to provide income, and the Wife's
ability to provide support.
The second theory the trial court employed was to award
Husband a compensating adjustment of alimony (1) because the
parties had a marriage of long duration which dissolved on
the threshold of a major change in income of the Wife due to
the collective efforts of both spouses, and (2) because the
trial court found that Wife's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during
the marriage.
Finally, Husband is entitled to an award of attorney's
fees and costs on appeal.

The trial court specifically

addressed the reasonableness of his attorney's fees, his

10

ability to pay them, and Wife's ability to assist in paying
Husband's fees.

The trial court awarded Husband attorney's

fees at the trial court and such an award is appropriate on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

WIFE'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REQUIRE THAT THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT BE ACCEPTED.
"To overturn a trial court's finding of fact, ^an

appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the
findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the findings/'

Bailey-

Allen, 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Coalville
City v. Lundgreen, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App.
1997)(quoting Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah
1989)), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997).

Two of the

issues which the Wife has raised in her Brief attack the
trial court's findings.

Specifically, the Wife has brought

the following issues on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err when it based its alimony

award from inferred facts and from income earned during only
one year of a twenty-one year marriage?

11

2.

Did the trial court err in finding that Husband is

unable to earn more than $12.00 per hour?
However, the Wife has failed to marshal any evidence in
support of the lower court's findings as to these issues.
Further, the Wife has mischaracterized the trial court's
findings and the facts on which the trial court relied.
The trial court did not simply pick one year out of the
parties' 21 year marriage arbitrarily to establish a
standard of living.

The trial court generally discussed the

income of the family and the Husband's earnings from 1956
forward.

(ROA 426). The trial court also considered the

contributions made by the Wife's part-time and full-time
employment, as well as her contributions to the family
expenses made through her student loans.

(ROA 426). The

trial court specifically found the income history of the
family to be $51,000 in 1987 (ROA 428) the year the Wife
entered medical school.

During the four years the Wife was

in medical school the trial court specifically found the
family's income to be $41,000, $36,000, $36,000, and $30,000
respectively (ROA 427). After medical school, when the
Husband left his job in Arizona so that the Wife could
finish her residency requirements in Utah, the family's
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income was $34,000 in 1992, $57,000 in 1993, and $100,000 in
1994.

(ROA 428). However, the Wife has failed to marshal

this evidence and has mischaracterized the trial court's
findings by arguing that the "trial court erred when it
based its alimony award from inferred facts and from income
during only one year of a twenty-one year marriage."

(Aplt.

Brief p. 12). The trial court clearly considered the
specific family earnings for the eight years listed, and
generally considered Husband's earnings and employment since
1956.
The second issue the Wife has raised which attacks the
trial court's findings concerns the Husband's earning
potential.

The Wife argues that "[t]he trial court erred in

finding that husband's earning capacity was limited to
$12.00 per hour."

(Aplt. Brief p. 15). The Wife

acknowledges that the trial court found that the Husband:
(1) was 56 years of age at the time of trial; (2) had worked
as a heavy equipment operator since 1956; (3) had no formal
education beyond high school; and (4) was earning $12.00 per
hour at the time of trial working as a heavy equipment
operator in St. George, Utah.

(Aplt. Brief p. 15,16).

While this evidence is sufficient to support the trial
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court's findings, more evidence was available which the Wife
neglected to marshal.
The Wife argues that the trial court found that the
although the Husband was earning $12.00 per hour in Utah,
"he would have been earning $15.00 per hour if he had not
moved to Utah from Arizona. . . . [t]here is no explanation
for this discrepancy."

(Aplt. Brief p. 15). However, there

is an explanation clearly explained by the trial court.

The

trial court found that the Husband "testified without
rebuttal that because Utah is a non-union state, the top
wage available in 1991 for a heavy equipment operator was
$10.00 per hour" and that in 1995, "at the time trial [he]
was earning $12.00 per hour . . .
operator . . .

as a heavy equipment

in St. George, Utah."

(ROA 429).

Therefore, the court's justification for using the
lower hourly wage was due to the unrebutted fact that,
because Utah is a non-union state, the Husband could not
earn as much here as elsewhere.

The court also clearly

found that this move to Utah, and the subsequent decrease in
the Husband's earning capacity, was not made by the
Husband's choice.
medical career.

The move was made to forward the Wife's

"[The Wife] graduated from medical school
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in May 1991 and the parties moved to Ogden, Utah to allow
[the Wife] to complete her internship and residency
requirements at McKay Dee Hospital/'

(ROA 427). These

facts were not marshaled in by Wife in support of the trial
court's findings.
Rather than marshaling the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstrating that, even if
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings,
the Wife attempts to offer pure speculation and conjecture
to attack the trial court's findings.

The Wife argues that

"there is no reason to believe husband will stay in Utah and
continue to work for lower pay . . . [i]t appears more
likely that he will follow the construction booms in other
nearby states."

(Aplt. Brief p. 15). This statement is

made without cite or evidentiary support and has no basis in
the record.

In fact the trial court found that "[w]hen the

parties separated [the Husband] returned to Arizona to look
for union employment similar to that he gave up to move to
Utah but

was unable

added).

Also, Husband will be of retirement age in very few

years.

to find

any/'

(ROA 429, emphasis

It is just as logical to assume that he cannot work

15

or is the victim of age discrimination in hiring, as to
assume he will move to follow "booms/'
Due to Wife's complete lack of marshaling the evidence,
Wife has failed to demonstrate that, if the evidence
supporting the lower court's findings is viewed in a light
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is in any
way legally insufficient to support the findings.
Therefore, the findings of fact must be accepted by this
court.
II.

Bailey-Allen, 945 P.2d at 186.

WIFE IS PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE FINDINGS ABSENT
ALLEGED FRAUD ON THE COURT.
Wife drafted the Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law which were adopted by the trial court.
(ROA 397, Aplt. Addendum).

Wife's Appellate Brief then

attacks these findings and asserts material allegations of
fact which were already raised at trial.
"When, however, a party drafts findings which are
adopted by the court, and includes therein no
mention of a material allegation of fact raised at
trial, such party may be deemed to have waived any
objection to the failure of the trial court to
make such a finding. Such a waiver must be

considered

conclusive

upon appeal.

To rule

otherwise would permit a party tacitly to omit a
material finding of fact from the proposed
findings, and then pursue reversal as a matter of
law due to failure of the trial court to make such
a finding." Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931, 935
(Utah 1979)(emphasis added) (citing Farrell v.
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Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah 1971).
Wife has not alleged any fraud on the trial court.

Wife is

simply trying to argue the same facts as were argued and
considered at trial because she is not satisfied with the
trial court's decision.

Therefore, Wife is precluded from

challenging the findings of the trial court.

See Howard,

601 P.2d at 934 (holding that plaintiff was precluded from
challenging the findings of the trial court where plaintiff
drafted the findings which were adopted by the trial court
and did not allege a fraud on the court).
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD TO HUSBAND WAS CLEARLY
WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION.
A trial court must consider three factors in setting a
reasonable award of alimony: 1) the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for himself;
and 3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App.
1988)(citing Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App.
1987)); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see
also §30-3-5 (7) (a) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998).
"If these three factors have been considered, we will
not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a
17

serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion.

Schindler, 776 P.2d at 90 (citing Fullmer v.

Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 950 (Utah App. 1988); Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 1988)).

"The

ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the party
receiving alimony will be able to support him or herself *as
nearly as possible at the standard of living . . . enjoyed
during the marriage."' Id. (quoting English v. English, 565
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).

"In formulating alimony awards,

the trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest
injustice."

Watson, 837 P.2d at 3.

In addition to the goal of maintaining parties as
nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage, Utah has also recognized the employment of an
alimony award as "compensating adjustment" where a marriage
of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the parties due to the
collective efforts of both.

Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d

538, 542 (Utah 1991); §30-3-5(7)(e) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998).
The trial court's findings clearly support the alimony
award under each of these theories.

18

A.

The Trial Court's Award of Alimony to Husband Was
Within Its Discretion as the Trial Court
Considered All Three of the Factors to Maintain
Husband at the Standard of Living Enjoyed During
the Marriage.

As stated above, a trial court must consider three
factors in setting a reasonable award of alimony: 1) the
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient
income for himself; and 3) the ability of the payor spouse
to provide support.
(citations omitted).

Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124
The trial court made specific and

detailed findings on each of these three issues in awarding
alimony to the Husband in the amount of $1,500 per month for
four years and $800 per month for seventeen years
thereafter.
First, the trial court carefully made findings as to
the family's income and earnings with general findings from
1956 through 1987 and exact findings from 1987 through 1994,
the last full year of the parties' marriage.

(ROA 426-428).

Specifically, the trial court found that the annual family
income fluctuated from $30,000 to $100,000 during the
marriage.

(ROA 427-428).

The trial court discussed the

duties and contributions of both of the parties from 1956
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through 1994.

(ROA 426-427).

The trial court made findings

as to the family's living arrangements and housing.
427).

(ROA

The family had little to no savings, and therefore it

is clear 'that their entire income went to finance their
standard of living.

In fact, while in Tucson, the parties

were subsidized by student loans to support their standard
of living as well as by Husband's income.

(These loans were

repaid by Wife's first employer after medical school).
The trial court used $51,000 as a "fair benchmark" as
the "general standard of living enjoyed by the parties
during the marriage."

(ROA 428). At the time of trial, the

Husband earned $12.00 per hour, or $2,080 gross per month.
This amounts to $24,960 gross per year.

With $1,500 per

month is alimony, the Husband would have $42,960 to attempt
to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage for the first four years.

After these four years,

Husband would be approximately 60 years of age, and if he
can continue to work at $12.00 per hour, with $800 per month
in alimony, he will have $34,560 to maintain the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage.

Surely, the $51,000

figure employed by the court was within the court's
discretion as the family income was $57,000 in 1993 and
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$100,000 in 1994, the two years of the marriage closest to
the trial date.

During the years that the family earned

less, the Wife was not contributing any income to the
family,1 or the Husband was unable to find work after the
family's relocation to Ogden, which was made to facilitate
the Wife's completion of her residency requirements.
Second, the trial court specifically addressed the
Husband's "earning capacity or ability to produce income/'
(ROA 428-430) .

The trial court found that the Husband was

56 years of age, only had work experience as a heavy
equipment operator, and had no formal education beyond high
school.

(ROA 428). The trial court specifically found that

Husband had sacrificed a higher paying job in Arizona to
facilitate Wife's medical career by moving to Utah, a nonunion state, where his earning capacity was 20% lower than
Arizona.

(ROA 429). The trial court specifically found

that, after the parties had separated, the higher paying
work in Arizona was no longer available, and that Husband
was earning $12.00 per hour in St. George, Utah.

(ROA 429).

These findings clearly support the trial court's

1

However, approximately $6,500 of the Wife's student
loans per year were used to supplement to Husband paying all
of the family expenses.
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finding that, at the time of trial, Husband's "age and
skills limit him to a position as a heavy equipment operator
and make him unable to produce income greater than $12.00
per hour."

(ROA 429).

If Husband's earning capacity

changes in the future, Wife can always petition to modify
the alimony award as allowed under existing Utah law.
Third, the trial court specifically addressed the
Wife's ability to provide support.

(ROA 430). The trial

court found that, under the Wife's employment contract at
the time of trial, she earned $120,000 per year, or $10,000
per month gross and $7,000 per month net.

(ROA 430).

In

addition to this substantial income, the hospital also paid
her overhead, her continuing medical education, her
malpractice insurance, and her student loan payments.
199-200) .

(ROA

The court specifically found that the Wife had

reasonable monthly expenses of $4,104, leaving $2,896 per
month out of her net income beyond her expenses to help the
Husband maintain a reasonable standard of living.

(ROA

430) .
As the trial court specifically addressed each of the
three factors required under Utah law to set an alimony
award that will maintain the Husband, as nearly as possible,
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at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, the
trial court's award of alimony was within its broad
discretion.

See Watson, 837 P.2d at 3; Schindler, 776 P.2d

at 90; Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 950; Andersen, 757 P.2d at 478.
B.

The Trial Court's Award of Alimony to Husband Was
Within Its Discretion as a Compensating
Adjustment.

"When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing
the marital property and in determining the amount
of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony/' §30-3-5 (7) (e) UTAH
CODE ANN. (1998) .
This statute was enacted after the Martinez case.

In

Martinez, the parties were married for 17 years, during
which time the husband went to medical school, against the
wishes of the wife.

818 P.2d at 539.

The wife "did not

contribute financially to her husband's medical education."
Id.

However, the trial court found that the wife "made

substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate the completion
of [the husband's] medical schooling and internship/'

Id.

In discussing the alimony issue, the Supreme Court of Utah
held that:
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When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change, should be given some weight in
fashioning the support award . . . [t]hus, if one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, it may be appropriate for the
trial court to make a compensating adjustment in
dividing marital property and awarding alimony/'
Id. (citations omitted).

In the current case, the trial court found that "the
parties had a marriage of long duration —

21 years —

and

that it dissolved on the threshold of a major change in the
income of the [Wife] due to the collective efforts of both
spouses."

(ROA 431). This finding required that the trial

court consider this change in determining the amount of
alimony.

The code orders that upon such a finding the trial

court "shall" consider this change in awarding alimony.

The

trial court did not have any discretion to not consider this
change as it would have been legal error to ignore this
change upon the findings.
The trial court also found that the Wife's "earning
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of
both spouses during the marriage."

(ROA 431). Upon making

this finding, the code allows the trial court the discretion
to make a compensating adjustment in awarding alimony.
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The trial court specifically found that the Husband
"provided the infrastructure that supported the [Wife] in
her accustomed lifestyle while she attended school/'
431).

(ROA

The trial court found that the Husband paid for the

bulk of the family expenses during the marriage, including
the purchase of the house in Tucson which was bought so that
Wife could attend medical school there.

(ROA 431). The

Husband's efforts allowed the Wife to hire a nanny while in
her last two years in medical school so that she could focus
on her medical training.

(ROA 431). The trial court found

that the employment of the nanny "allowed [Wife] to spend
increased time at the school and the hospital, [and] was
made possible by the home financed by [Husband's] salary."
(ROA 431).
The trial court further found that while Wife and the
children lived in Tucson so that Wife could attend medical
school, Husband remained in Phoenix so that he could keep
his job and support the family and Wife's education.
432).

(ROA

During this time, because the Husband was paying the

mortgage on the house in Tucson, he lived in a travel
trailer in Phoenix on his parents' property and traveled an
average of 240 miles each weekend to Tucson to visit Wife
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and the children.

(ROA 432).

In spite of these clear findings, Wife argues that
"there is no evidence that husband was disadvantaged
economically in any way . . . [h]e made no personal
sacrifices that resulted in a reduced standard of living
because he did not suffer a loss of income."

(Aplt. Brief

p. 19). The trial court clearly found that Husband lived in
a travel trailer in order to keep his job so that he could
afford to buy a house in Tucson so that Wife could attend
medical school.

This is one sacrifice Husband made to

enhance the Wife's earning potential at his expense.
Husband almost completely supported Wife while she was in
school.

Husband's sacrifices allowed Wife to hire a nanny

so that she could spend more time at the medical school and
in the hospital to enhance her career.

Husband left his job

in Arizona to move with the family to Ogden, Utah to
facilitate the Wife's finishing of her residency
requirements.

This move caused Husband to lose his job and

move to a non-union state where wages for the type of job he
was qualified for were" much lower.

After the separation,

Husband tried to get his job in Arizona back, but it was not
available so he had to take a 20% wage decrease working in
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St. George, Utah.
Surely these qualify as both economic sacrifices and
the sacrifices of living apart from his family and solely
supporting his family, which have greatly enhanced Wife's
earning potential.

Prior to Husband making these sacrifices

to facilitate Wife's education she earned no more than
$15,000 in a year.
earned $100,000.

In the last year of the marriage, she
The year of trial she earned $120,000

along with many other aforementioned benefits.

This amounts

to an enhanced earning of 666% and 800% respectively.2

It

is obvious that Wife's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced by the efforts of both spouses during the marriage
and a compensating award is appropriate under these
circumstances.
Wife argues that Husband is not entitled to a
compensating award of alimony because his "contributions to
the support of the family while wife attended medical school
was the same support contributions he made willingly when
the wife stayed home and took care of the children."

(Aplt.

Brief p. 20). While irrelevant, this statement is also a
misrepresentation of the facts.

2

$100,000/$15,000 = 666% and $120,000/$15,000 = 800%.
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Prior to the Wife's entering medical school, the family
did not live separate requiring the Husband, as the primary
wage earner to support two households.

This sacrifice was

made only to facilitate the Wife's attendance at medical
school in Tucson.

Prior to the Wife's entering medical

school, the family never needed to employ a nanny.

This

employment was made possible through Husband's paying the
mortgage on the house in Tucson, although he only was able
to stay there on weekends.

Prior to Wife's entering medical

school, Husband was able to live with his family, but due to
the Wife's need to live in Tucson and the family's need for
the Husband to continue to solely support them with his job
in Phoenix, Husband had to drive 240 miles each weekend to
see his family.

Prior to the Wife's entering medical

school, the family lived in Arizona, a union state, where
Husband was able to earn, in 1990, 125% of what he can earn
currently in Utah.

He had to give up his job and seniority

in Arizona to facilitate Wife's medical career.
If this Court accepts Wife's theory of a compensating
adjustment to alimony, a spouse who has always supported
his/her family could never receive a compensating award
because this would be the same support the earning spouse
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had always provided.
useless.

This would render §30-3-5(7)(e)

Wife's theory is against the clear language of the

code and case law and would provide unjust and unfair
results to spouses in Husband's situation who made great
sacrifices to facilitate Wife attaining her medical degree,
only to be divorced immediately after she finished her
residency.
Wife also argues that a compensating or reimbursement
type of award of alimony should only be considered "where
the supporting spouse becomes economically disadvantaged in
a virtually absolute sense in that they were unable to earn
a living either at all or above minimum wage."
10).

(Aplt. Brief

This argument has absolutely no basis in the code or

case law.

Utah has never required a finding that the

recipient spouse be "economically disadvantaged in a
virtually absolute sense" or be "unable to earn a living
either at all or above minimum wage" in order to be awarded
a compensating award of alimony.

Such a requirement would

be completely contrary to all Utah law which states that
alimony should be employed to: (1) keep the parties, as near
as possible, at the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage; (2) equalize the parties' respective standards of

29

living; or (3) to compensate or reimburse a spouse, after a
marriage of long duration, when the marriage dissolves on
the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both.

See §30-3-

5(7); Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121; Eames, 735 P.2d 395;
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072; Martinez, 818 P.2d 538; Schindler, 776
P.2d 84; Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993);
Watson, 837 P.2d 1.

Nowhere in Utah law is a finding of

poverty required under any of the theories of alimony in
Utah, and such a requirement would be contrary to all Utah
law and public policy.
This was a 21 year marriage where the Husband made
numerous and substantial sacrifices to enhance the Wife's
career and earning capacity, including (1) providing nearly
all of the support for the family during Wife's medical
education, prior to which she was employed, at least parttime; (2) living apart from his family so that he could keep
his job to support Wife's move to Tucson for her education
and driving 240 miles each weekend to be with his family all
he could; (3) providing the means for Wife to hire a nanny
to take care of the kids and the house while in her last two
years of medical school; and (4) sacrificing his job in
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Arizona and accepting a 20% pay decrease in Utah to
facilitate the Wife finishing her residency and internship
requirements in Utah.

These sacrifices allowed Wife to

enhance her earning capacity 800%.

On the threshold of this

major change in her earning capacity, the marriage
dissolved.

Therefore, the trial court was clearly within

its discretion in awarding a compensating adjustment of
alimony to Husband in an amount "necessary both to restore
[Husband] to the standard of living enjoyed during the
parties' marriage, and to compensate [Husband] for his
contribution to [Wife's] increased earning capacity."

(ROA

434) .
C.

The Trial Court Was Within Its Discretion In
Awarding Husband Alimony For 21 Years.

The Wife also argues that

xx

[t]he trial court erred in

awarding alimony for twenty-one years."

(Aplt Brief p. 16).

However, this is not a question of legal error, an award of
alimony, including the duration, by a trial court is
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.

See Jones, 700

P.2d at 1075 (holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering temporary alimony); Andersen, 757
P.2d at 479 (holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering that alimony terminate upon the
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completion of schooling without requiring a showing a
material change in financial circumstances).
The Utah Code requires that the trial court consider
the length of the marriage in determining alimony.
5(7)(a)(iv) UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-

The trial court found that the

parties had been married for 21 years at the time of trial.
(ROA 425). The trial court ordered alimony to continue for
21 years.

(ROA 436). The trial court made specific

findings as to Husband's income potential and prospective
retirement income.

(ROA 430).

In addition, the trial court

found that Husband's expenses would remain relatively
constant and that "in order to keep [Husband] at an
appropriate standard of living it is necessary to continue
alimony past the point of [Husband's] retirement . . . [and]
that alimony should continue for 21 years, or the length of
the parties' marriage/'

(ROA 430) .

As the trial court clearly considered the financial
condition of Husband, his standard of living, the length of
the parties' marriage, and Husband's possible retirement
income, it is obvious that the trial court's award of
alimony for 21 years was within the trial court's
discretion.
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IV.

HUSBAND SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL.
"^Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded

below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will
also be awarded to that party on appeal.'" Watson, 837 P.2d
at 8 (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App.
1991) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.
1990)).

Husband was awarded attorney's fees in the lower

court after a careful analysis of the reasonableness of the
fees, the Husband's ability to pay said fees, and the Wife's
financial ability to contribute to the Husband's attorney's
fees.

(ROA 435); see Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122

(Utah App. 1990) (citing Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331,
1336 (Utah App. 1988); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1986); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980);
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah App. 1989).
Therefore, Husband should be awarded his attorney's fees on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Husband greatly assisted the Wife in attaining her
medical degree and enhancing her medical career through
financial support, sacrificing time with his family,
sacrificing his job in Arizona, and contributing all the
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intangible emotional support which is needed when a spouse
attends a challenging professional school and engages in a
demanding career.

Almost immediately after Wife had

completed her residency requirements, the marriage was
dissolved.

Husband is now almost 60, has work experience

only with heavy construction equipment, and has a high
school education.
The alimony award of $1,500 per month for four years
and $800 per month for seventeen years thereafter is clearly
appropriate as it is only a small fraction of Wife's
earnings at the time of the trial, which earnings were made
possible by both parties' contributions, and "is necessary
both to restore [Husband] to the standard of living enjoyed
during the parties' marriage, and to compensate [Husband]
for his contribution to [Wife's] increased earning
capacity."

(ROA 434).

For the foregoing reasons, Husband requests that this
Court affirm the trial court's award of alimony, in amount
and duration, and award him his attorney's fees and costs
incurred pursuant to this appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of June, 1999.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WE3ER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

WENDALYN ENCE nka WENDALYN
SMITH,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

p~.
•*

LARRY D. ENCE,

Case No. 954900029~
Defendant.

This matter is before the court on remand from the Coifrt of*Appeals to make additional findings to support the alimony award
and to reassess the award based on the additional findings. The
court is also directed to redetermine the attorney fees award based
on additional findings. This court apologizes to the parties and
the appellate court for the inadequate findings. The court makes
the following findings of fact:

I. ALIMONY
1.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 25, 1974;

plaintiff was 21 years of age and defendant was 35 years of age. At
the time of trial they had been married 21 years. The parties have
two children who have reached majority.
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A.
2.

The financial

condition

and needs of the

defendant:

The court was not provided with a list of defendant's current

monthly expenses and so must therefore infer defendant's needs from
the limited evidence provided and from the standard of living
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage.
3.

Since 1956, and throughout the parties' marriage, defendant

has been employed full time as a heavy equipment operator. Although
his salary fluctuated, defendant earned as much as $18.52 per hour
during the parties' marriage. Plaintiff supplemented the family
income in secretarial positions prior to entering school full time.
While the parties' children were young, plaintiff was the primary
care giver and also worked part time at home as a typist.
4.

In

January

1981

plaintiff

entered

college

at

Glendale

Community College, later transferring to Grand Canyon University.
After her first semester of college plaintiff did not work outside
of the home until she graduated with her undergraduate degree in
May of 1985. Plaintiff's undergraduate education was financed
through

two

loans,

totaling

$6,000,

and

some

scholarships.

Plaintiff paid off the loans in December 1991 with post-residency
earnings.
5.

From 1985 to 1987, plaintiff worked as an estimator for an

industrial truss company and as a substitute teacher. She earned
approximately $15,000 per year. In 1987 the parties earned $51,000
jointly.
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6.

The parties lived in a mobile home until they purchased a

small home when their children were young. When the parties moved
to Phoenix, Arizona in 1980, they sold that home for approximately
$32,000 and purchased a single 14 x 70 mobile home. They lived
together in the mobile home until the plaintiff moved with the
children to Tucson, Arizona, in 1987 to attend medical school.
7.

Plaintiff was accepted into medical school at the University

of Arizona in Tucson in 1987. The parties purchased a home in
Tucson and plaintiff moved there with the two children. During the
week defendant stayed in a travel trailer in Phoenix and traveled
home on the weekends,
8.

Plaintiff borrowed approximately $49,000 in student loans to

finance her medical education, and contributed an average of $6,500
per year from the loans to meet family expenses. The majority of
family expenses were paid by the defendant's earnings, which were
approximately $18.52 per hour when plaintiff began medical school
and were $15.00 per hour when plaintiff graduated and the parties
moved to Ogden. The income history of the family during plaintiff's
time in medical school is as follows: $41,000 in 1988, $36,000 in
1989, $36,000 in 1990, and $30,000 in 1991.
9.

Plaintiff graduated from medical school in May 1991 and the

parties moved to Ogden, Utah to allow plaintiff to complete her
internship and residency requirements at McKay Dee Hospital. The
parties rented a home in Ogden for $745.00 per month. Defendant was
unable to find suitable employment in Utah and he then remained
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home to care for their teenage children. The parties earned $34,000
in 1992, $57,000 in 1993, and $100,000 in 1994.
10.

Until the parties' 1994 vacation in Alaska, vacations were

infrequent

and were spent visiting

relatives. They purchased

moderately priced cars and did not buy expensive clothing. The
parties' major asset at the time of trial was their home in Tucson.
11.

At the time of trial plaintiff was living in the rented four-

bedroom Ogden home, and defendant was renting a camp trailer from
a

cousin

in St. George, Utah, for $500 per month. Although

defendant argued he was unable to move into an apartment on his
current income, the court questioned that assertion.
12.

During their marriage, with the exception of 1994, the last

year of their marriage, the parties lived within a modest family
income. Specifically, the court finds that the parties enjoyed as
of 1987 a standard of living available to a family of four on
approximately $51,000 per year of gross income. This court finds
that the family income and standard of living existing in 1987 is
a fair benchmark of the general standard of living enjoyed by the
parties during the marriage and accordingly, an award of alimony
should allow defendant to sustain a comparable standard of living.

B. Defendant's
13.

earning

capacity

or ability

to produce

income:

Defendant was 56 years old at the time of trial. He has worked

as a heavy equipment

operator

since 1956. He has no formal

education beyond high school.

428

Findings of Fact c^d Order
Case No. 954900029
Page 5
14.

When the parties separated defendant returned to Arizona to

look for union employment similar to that he gave up to move to
Utah but was unable to find any. He testified without rebuttal that
because Utah is a non-union state, the top wage available in 1991
for a heavy equipment operator was $10.00 per hour. At the time of
trial defendant was earning $12.00 per hour, or $2,080 gross and
$1,600 net per year, as a heavy equipment operator for Delray
Jackson Construction in St. George, Utah.
15.

The court finds that defendant's age and skills limit him to

a position as a heavy equipment operator and make him unable to
produce income greater than $12.00 per hour.
16.

When the parties moved to Ogden to allow plaintiff to complete

her internship and residency requirements, defendant gave up his
union position in Arizona, where he was making $15.00 per hour. The
court finds that, but for the parties' move to Utah, defendant
would be earning between $15 per hour, or $2600 per month, and $17
per hour, or $2947 per month.1 He is now earning $12 per hour, or
$2080 per month.
17.

Defendant's retirement benefits had vested at the time of

trial. If defendant retired at the time of trial, at 56 years of

Although defendant testified that his salary in Arizona was
going to stay at $15 per hour, the court believes his pay would
have been raised periodically to keep pace with inflation.
Accordingly, based on defendant's testimony that pay in Utah for a
comparable job rose from $10 per hour when he first arrived to $12
per hour at the time of trial, the court sets the range of
defendant's possible salary in Arizona at $15 per hour to $17 per
hour.
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age (without adjustment for the Woodward share reduction), he would
be eligible to receive $326.50 per month in benefits for the rest
of his life. If he waited until he was 62 years of age to retire,
he would collect $466.50 per month in retirement benefits. At trial
plaintiff was awarded a Woodward share of defendant's retirement.
18.

The court anticipates that defendant's monthly expenses will

remain relatively constant even after his retirement, in order to
keep defendant at an appropriate standard of living it is necessary
to continue alimony past the point of defendant's retirement. This
court finds that alimony should continue for 21 years, or the
length of the parties' marriage.

C. Plaintiff's
19.

ability

to provide

support:

At the time of trial plaintiff had a contract with the Medical

Arts Clinic in Brigham City, Utah, for employment through August
1997. Plaintiff was unsure of her employment after that time. Under
her contract, plaintiff earned $120,000 per year, or $10,000 per
month gross and $7,000 per month net. In addition to her salary,
the hospital pays plaintiff's overhead expenses, her continuing
medical education expenses, and her malpractice insurance.
20.

The court finds that plaintiff has reasonable monthly expenses

of $4,104, which includes some of the expenses associated with
caring for the parties' adult children.
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21.

Compensating

Adjustment

The court finds that the parties had a marriage of long

duration—21 years—and that it dissolved on the threshold of a
major change in the income of the plaintiff due to the collective
efforts of both spouses. The court further finds that plaintiff's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of
both spouses during the marriage. Although plaintiff clearly earned
her medical degree through personal determination and sacrifice,
defendant's efforts to assist her cannot be ignored. Specifically
the court finds:
a.

Defendant provided the infrastructure that supported the

plaintiff in her accustomed lifestyle while she attended
school. Defendant's salary paid for the bulk of the household
expenses, including the payment on the house in Tucson. In
addition, during plaintiff's third and fourth years of medical
school she was able to offer a first-year medical student a
room

in the parties' house in return for the student's

services as a nanny. This arrangement, which allowed plaintiff
to spend increased time at the school and the hospital, was
made possible by the home financed by defendant's salary.
b.

Until entering school, plaintiff contributed to the

family income through various full-time or part-time jobs.
During the time plaintiff was in school she did not work, with
the exception of the first semester of her undergraduate year.
Prior

to

entering medical

school, plaintiff

contributed
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$15,000 per year to meet the family expenses. While she was in
medical school she contributed an average of $6,500 per year
from her student loans to household expenses.2 Plaintiff
therefore contributed less to the family income during her
schooling than she had previously.
c.

While plaintiff was in medical school, plaintiff and the

children lived in the family's home in Tucson and defendant
lived in a travel trailer on his parent's property in Phoenix.
Defendant traveled an average of 240 miles each weekend to
visit the family.
22.

Plaintiff argues that the financial support defendant provided

plaintiff simply met his statutory duty of support, and that
plaintiff's educational accomplishments came as a result solely of
her own increased efforts. Although the court recognizes that
plaintiff's degree is a credit to her dedication and hard work, it
cannot so easily categorize the support defendant provided her
during her schooling. Plaintiff's approach does not take into
account and value the intangible emotional support or encouragement
provided to the plaintiff, or the sacrifices made by the defendant
during this time. "The very idea of marriage contemplates mutual
effort and mutual sacrifice.7' Martinez

v. Martinez,

818 P.2d 538,

541 (Utah 1991). Plaintiff's education was a marital endeavor; the
court cannot sort through each parties' contributions, separate
2

The $6,500 per year from the student loans was plaintiff's
contribution to the family income because plaintiff paid off or
will pay off the loans through her post-residency earnings.
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defendant's

support, and

dismiss

it as

not

contributing

to

plaintiff's capacity to greatly enhance her income.3
23.

The court accordingly finds that plaintiff's earning capacity

has been greatly enhanced due to the efforts of both spouses during
the marriage and that a compensating adjustment is appropriate in
this case.

2. Equalization
24.

of Income

Although the court recognizes that defendant contributed to

plaintiff's increased earning capacity, the court finds that it is
not appropriate to equalize the parties'

income

or standards

of

living. There is authority that "an alimony award should, to the
extent possible, equalize the parties' respective post-divorce
living standards," Rasband

v. Rasband,

752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah

Ct. App. 1980), however the court does not find that m

this

situation equalization is appropriate. The court believes that
under these facts a better method of compensating defendant for his
contribution

to plaintiff's

increased earning capacity

is to

provide reimbursement alimony.
25.

Equalization

of

the

parties'

standards

of

living

is

inappropriate first, because during the parties' marriage they did
not enjoy the standard of living now attainable with plaintiff's
3

It is interesting to note that the flip side of this
argument--that a wife who maintains a home has offered no more than
her statutory services of support--has never been accepted by the
courts. Utah courts have always valued each spouse's contribution,
financial or otherwise, to marital endeavors.
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increased earning capacity, and second, because defendant is able,
with a limited alimony award, to support himself at the standard of
living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. Compare
Gardner

v.

Gardner,

748 P.2d

1076, 1081

(Utah 1988) (finding

equalization appropriate where wife could not support herself at
the high standard of living the parties had enjoyed together);
Peterson

v.

Peterson,

737

P.2d

237

n.4

(Utah

App.

1987)

(distinguishing its fact pattern from a situation where one party
is on the verge of higher earning potential, where a more creative
alimony award may be necessary to achieve fairness) .
26.

Further, although the court finds that the parties' joint

efforts made plaintiff's education possible, the court emphasizes
that clearly plaintiff's achievements are due in large part to her
own extended efforts.
27.

The court finds that an award of reimbursement alimony will

assist the defendant in establishing

a level of housing and

personal property ownership that will thereafter allow him, with an
ongoing alimony award, to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed by the
parties during the marriage.

F.
28.

Award of

Alimony

In summary, the court finds that an award of alimony is

necessary both to restore defendant to the standard of living
enjoyed during the parties' marriage, and to compensate defendant
for his contribution to plaintiff's increased earning capacity.
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Defendant is therefore awarded $1500 per month for the first four
years following the parties' divorce, and then $800 per month for
17 more years.

II.
1.

ATTORNEY FEES

The court finds that the rate charged by defendant's attorney,

Ms. Corporon, of $150.00 is reasonable considering her experience
and is consistent with rates charged in the area for similar
services.
2.

Defendant's attorney fees will total $3,000. The court finds

this total amount to be reasonable considering the complexity of
the case.
3.

Without consideration of the alimony award, defendant does not

have the financial assets to pay his own attorney fees. He nets $1600 per month, and is without sufficient savings or assets to
cover the expense.
4.

The court finds, however, that the defendant, with his initial

alimony payments of $1500, has the necessary income to pay $2,000
of his own attorney fees.
5.

Plaintiff, whose monthly income is approximately $7000 per

month net, has the financial ability to pay her own attorney fees
and to pay the remainder of defendant's attorney fees.
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III.
1.

ORDER

Defendant is hereby awarded alimony of $1500 per month for

four years and then $800 per month for seventeen more years.
2.

Plaintiff shall pay $1,000 of defendant's attorney fees and

shall be responsible for her own attorney fees.
Counsel

for the parties shall please prepare appropriate

amended findings and a decree.
Dated this

/U

day of September, 1997.

Michael y

Glasmann, Judge
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